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island to 418 (12. 80.5), and never even mentions the issue of neutrality. During the Sicilian
expedition, the neutral position of Italian city-states is accurately reported (12. 3.4-5), but neutral
Acragas is incorrectly said to have allied itself with Athens (12. 4.2 [as though Diodorus' source
believed the argument of Hermocrates quoted by Thucydides and discussed above]). Likewise, the
neutrality of Camarina, Messene, and the Sicel cities of the interior of Sicily is accurately recorded
(12.4.2), but Camarina is later (12. 12.4) included among states supporting Syracuse, without any of
Thucydides' careful and necessary explanation of the circumstances surrounding the Camarinaeans'
change in policy.
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[14]
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For the fourth century, Diodorus nevertheless becomes increasingly important both because of the
unreliability of Xenophon's Hellenica and, for the period after 362, because he provides the only
historical narrative that is extant. In most cases, however, this only confuses the situation. For
example, Diodorus' account of the revolution at Corinth in 394 is even more simplistic and misleading
than Xenophon's. In Diodorus' version, the conflict was a simple split between the pro-Spartan
oligarchic faction and their democratic opponents supported by Argos and Athens (14. 8.6). Nothing is
said about the original goal of peace or the independent posture (which even Xenophon acknowledges)
of those who first sought simply to extricate Corinth from the war.
Despite his uncritical approach, Diodorus includes much valuable information about neutrality. He
preserves the only accounts of the diplomacy surrounding the Carthaginian offer to respect the
neutrality of Acragas in 406 (13.85.2), the neutral posture adopted by some city-states following the
battle of Cnidus in 394 (14. 84.4), and Phocian efforts to secure the neutrality of other states during
the Third Sacred War of ca. 356/355-346 (16. 27.4, 33.2).[15] These few instances undoubtedly
represent just a fraction of the evidence available in the sources from which they were extracted; but
since the sources are now lost, anything preserved in Diodorus must be treated with special respect.
Sadly, the importance of Diodorus seems to lie primarily in his inclusion of many facts of whose value
he himself seems to have been ignorant.
The Attic orators also provide some valuable glimpses of contemporary attitudes toward neutrality.
The evidence they provide, however, must be treated with great caution. The aim of the orators was
to win in court and to influence public opinion and policy. Historical accuracy and truth are subordinate
to and often shamelessly violated for these purposes. Being Athenians, the orators rarely represent
the rights of other city-states in matters of foreign policy. For example, Isocrates brushes off the
celebrated infamy of Athens' brutal subjugation of Melos in 416 by implying that the Melians were
allies of Athens (cf. Diodorus above) who had revolted from the alliance and by claiming that it was
not evidence of bad rule if some of those at war with Athens were shown to have been severely
punished (4 [Paneg.]. 100-101). Elsewhere Melos
[15] On Carthage, see 8.1 below; on the Asiatic reaction to Cnidus, 8.3.F below; on Phocian diplomacy
in the Third Sacred War, 9.4 below.
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is casually mentioned as nothing more than an example of an excessively expensive siege (15 [Antid
.].113). Nowhere in Isocrates' writings is there any hint that Melos was an independent state
struggling to preserve a neutral diplomatic position, which the Athenians crushed in a spasm of
aggressive imperialism.[16]
Of all the orators, Demosthenes provides the best evidence of how the policy of neutrality was
viewed by those for whom it created the worst disadvantage. The simple truth is that in his acute
frustration at the reluctance of other Greek states to join Athens in opposition to Philip II,
Demosthenes increasingly portrayed as active support for Macedon what was in reality only
abstention.[17] Fortunately, we can trace the development of Demosthenes' attitude in part in the
surviving public speeches. For instance, in 341, when the outcome of Athens' struggle remained in
doubt, Demosthenes could still characterize the diplomatic situation without imputing it to wholesale
"Philippizing":
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